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TEXT AND PRECEDENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Patrick Higginbothamt
Giving to this panel the topic, "the conflict between text and
precedent in constitutional adjudication," has a generous assump-
tion that we will find common turf on the large field it describes. On
one level, the whole idea is oxymoronic in that precedent that con-
flicts with text is not precedent. But this only points up the difficulty
of describing the role of precedent, an understandable difficulty be-
cause one's view of precedent is bound up with views of law itself.
Because language is the lawyers' tool, or as Charles Black puts it, the
linseed oil of the law, it is equally understandable that the lawyers'
response to the topic is, "what is text and what is precedent?" It is
then the disabilities of a legal education, or perhaps the absence of
much more, that lead me to describe precedent with its difficulties
before turning to its fit with text.
I
Even describing the role of precedent quickly engages political
view because precedent is inevitably in part, sometimes in large
part, in the eye of the beholder. Yet, it is my strong conviction that
the concept of precedent has force and sufficient discipline to decide
the great percentage of cases that come to our court, including con-
stitutional issues; it is my observation that it in fact does so. That a
little mysticism, priestly role playing, and postured discovering of
the law has survived the realists and "law and" supporters, or even
that they are yet important to the acceptance ofjudicial law making,
does not mean that the concept of precedent lacks content at its
core. As Professor David P. Bryden put it in denying that constitu-
tional law is all politics and no law, "[tihe difference between a par-
tial myth and a complete myth is the difference between Abraham
Lincoln and the tooth fairy."'
In defining precedent we must distinguish among a larger set of
rules that also bind successors to a decision. While these rules may
incidentally serve purposes similar to the purposes of stare decisis,
their primary purpose is to cope with the increasing size and output
t Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
1 Bryden, Politics, The Constitution, and the New Formalism, in 3 CONSTrrtTIONAL COM-
MENTARY 415, 418 (1986).
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of the courts and to manage the mechanics ofjudicial decisionmak-
ing. For example, our circuit, as do many others, has a formal rule
that one panel cannot overturn another, and permitting only the en
banc court to reject our own precedent. Absent an intervening deci-
sion by the Supreme Court, we adhere to this rule regardless of how
wrong-headed the panel deciding the subsequent case may believe
the former case to be. Relatedly, we provide by rule that a panel
cannot decline to follow a decision of a sister circuit if it will create a
conflict among the circuits. These rules of orderliness are similar to
rules in some state appellate courts that insist that a unanimous de-
cision can be overturned only by a unanimous court. I leave to dev-
otees of game theory the exploration of how such rules can affect
outcomes. For now, I want to lay aside such rules.
Next we should keep in mind that the bind of first decision dif-
fers in its horizontal and vertical reaches. District judges do not
treat decisions of other district judges as binding and, apart from
conflict reducing rules, circuit courts do not treat decisions of sister
circuits as binding. In talking about precedent, I am then talking
about how the Supreme Court treats its own precedent and how
precedent binds on its vertical reach-first treating precedent in its
common law tradition as stare decisis, that is, to stand by decided
cases, and then adding to the mix, constitutional text.
As Roger J. Traynor pointed out: "in modem Italian stare
means to stay, to stand, to lie, or to sit, to remain, to keep, to stop,
or to wait. With delightful flexibility it also means to depend, to fit
or to suit, to live and, of course, to be." 2 As we will see, Italian may
better describe some views of precedent than Latin.
The values claimed for precedent are familiar. Professor Was-
serstrom lists four major justifications: certainty, reliance, equality,
and efficiency.3 He lists as minor justifications: practical experi-
ence, a notion resting "upon the hypothesis that judge-made law
enables the legal system to adapt itself quite readily to new situa-
tions and novel controversies by responding to these situations in
an a posteriori fashion as they arise"; restraint upon the individual
judge; and the termination of particular litigation.4 There is little to
quarrel with here. It is in applying the doctrine that its strengths
and weaknesses take definition.
In describing the mechanics of stare decisis, it is important to
keep in mind that the deciding court cannot fully control the prece-
dential force that its decision will have in the future. That strength
2 Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 745 (1970).
3 R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGALJUSTIFI-
CATION 60-74 (1961).
4 Id. at 74-81.
412 [Vol. 73:411
TEXT AND PRECEDENT
is in the main given by the later decisionmaker. Of course, the first
decider may write broadly and may even disclaim a holding, but the
accepted decisional process makes this effort less than fully effective.
That is, we accept that it is the rule of the case or ratio decidendi that
binds, and the successor court has play, often considerable, in de-
ciding what that holding is. As Karl N. Llewellyn teaches, the later
court can confine the first case to its facts concluding, for example,
that "[t]his rule holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta
Buick cars." 5 A court may equally give full sway to all that was said
in the earlier decision. Faced with multiple prior cases, it may si-
multaneously give broad and narrow readings. Stated in its happy
form, it is the Janus faced, as Llewellyn called it, quality of stare
decisis that allows the case method to evolve doctrine. Stated in
more fearsome terms, it is a considerable source ofjudicial power, a
power that may aptly be called the heartbeat of common law deci-
sionmaking. That is, the courts obedient to stare decisis have the
range, at least within an outer circle of an earlier case, to push the
law, often to push off in a quite different direction from the first
court, without overruling its decision.
It is important to remember that the stare decisis concept, or
doctrine if you prefer, offers no guidance for the interpreting court's
choice of whether it will give a broad or narrow reading to the first
holding. The push one way or the other must come from elsewhere;
elsewhere I will for now leave as judicial attitude. In its common law
mode its rationale is marked by heavy reliance upon analogical rea-
soning, or description, often leaving unidentified any regression line
or guiding value.
It would seem that as decisions are reached and a line of cases
are developed by a succession of broad and narrow readings, the
ambit of each succeeding deciding court is circumscribed, and so it
may be for the intellectually honest court. But under the tradition,
the deciding court's ambit of discretion is in part a function not only
of its honesty, but also its creative ability, or so it seems. There is a
baseline and it is that point at which facile restatements of prior
holdings, restatements of cases and discovery of underlying princi-
ples, become dissembling; but between blind adherence and dishon-
est statement lies a sometimes significant area that does seem to
reward the creative jurists with the opportunity to impose their will.
Nonetheless, as courts push toward the limit of dissembling treat-
ment of precedent they disserve the values of stare decisis. There is
a point at which there is no predictibility, where expectations are so
unsettled that parties cannot adjust their affairs. Such creativejuris-
5 K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72 (1960).
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prudence at this point begins to raise questions about whether the
"law" is any more than the judges' individual predilections. But the
difficulties are largely ones that revolve around the effectiveness of
rules and less about the power or authority of the decisionmaker.
I suggest that this occurs far less in the world of daily decisions
than my academic friends suppose. Law professors are bright and
creative. In their teaching and scholarship they thrive at the margin
where legal doctrine is developing, is uncertain, and, delights of de-
lights, internally inconsistent. Students barraged with socratic slic-
ing of these cases are given a skewed view of stare decisis and
perpetuate a voguish belief that law is little more than the judge's
predilection. But with this aside I return to my main point, that the
predictibility of judicial decisions must rest in part upon some
awareness of the attitudes of the judges that are reading the prece-
dent, given the latitude of the honest judge. As Judge Schaefer put
it in a lecture at this law school some twenty-one years ago:
If [the judge] views the role of the court as a passive one, he will
be willing to delegate the responsibility for change, and he will
not greatly care whether the delegated authority is exercised or
not. If he views the court as an instrument of society designed to
reflect in its decisions the morality of the community, he will be
more likely to look precedent in the teeth and to measure it
against the ideals and aspirations of his time. 6
So far I have not spoken of constitutional text or focused upon the
precedent force of decisions construing text. That is, I have not de-
scribed a system where the values are given and the force of prece-
dent is therefore different.
II
In turning to precedent and constitutional text, I start withJus-
tice Frankfurter's oft cited statement that "[tihe ultimate touchstone
of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have
said about it. ' 7 Questions about the power of common law courts
usually ask whether a particular decision ought to have been left for
the legislature; for the most part the lawmaking function of the com-
mon law judge is accepted on the assumption that the legislature is
available to correct errors.
Citing a dissenting opinion by justice Brandeis, Justice Stevens
stated in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Black-
mun that "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis has a more limited applica-
tion when the precedent rests on constitutional grounds, because
6 Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 23 (1966).
7 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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'correction through legislative action is practically impossible.' "8
Justice Brandeis in turn cited Justice Miller, who wrote in 1869:
With as full respect for the authority of former decisions, as
belongs, from teaching and habit, to judges trained in the com-
mon-law system of jurisprudence, we think that there may be
questions touching the powers of legislative bodies, which can
never be finally closed by the decisions of a court .... 9
Brandeis' opinion, handed down in 1931, cited forty cases in which
the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decisions.
But this describes the Supreme Court's treatment of its own
precedent and accepts its shorthand explanation that because Con-
gress cannot overturn their decision, the Court must be more will-
ing to do so. It does not develop a distinction between duty owed to
the Constitution and duty owed to decisions construing it. Presum-
ably, at least two sitting Justices, looking horizontally, see such a
difference. Justices Brennan and Marshall persist in their votes
against the death penalty in all cases despite contrary votes by a ma-
jority of the Justices. Presumably, they justify this persistence as a
rightful adherence to the Constitution and not to decisions concern-
ing it; or as Justice Frankfurter put it-the Constitution as the Jus-
tice reads it.
III
How the Supreme Court treats its own precedent is instructive
of how inferior courts ought, in turn, to treat rulings of the Supreme
Court; at least an inferior court, though unable to overrule, may em-
ploy accepted principles of stare decisis to define the holdings of the
Court.
It ought to be unnecessary to remind that courts, including the
Supreme Court, are empowered to decide cases and controversies.
They are not empowered to pronounce rules of governance other
than in the decision of cases and controversies. Because constitu-
tional law is then the holdings of cases, their reach is informed by
the way in which courts treat precedent, and courts do here have a
regression line; the value choices are made-by text.
Of course, inferior courts must follow the Supreme Court. But,
this duty of obedience is defined in substantial part by the accepted
manner of treating precedent, and presumably no other branch of
government owes decisions of the Court any greater duty of obedi-
8 Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272-73 n.18 (1980) (quot-
ing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
9 Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439, 444 (1864) (Miller, J.,
dissenting).
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ence than is owed by the lower courts. Sometimes then, the faithful-
ness of lower courts and other branches of government to decisions
of the Court are in part in the eye of the beholder. I conclude this
opening by using two famous cases to illustrate the difficulty.
In 1948, the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer,'0 speaking
through Chief Justice Vinson, concluded that enforcement by state
courts of racially restrictive covenants controlling the sale of real
estate was state action. While inferior courts were obligated to obey
the holding of Shelley, it's holding if read too broadly was fairly de-
batable. So read, the Court would have found state action in most
of the state action cases that followed. For example, in Evans v. Ab-
ney I I the Court faced the question of whether under Shelley the en-
forcement by the courts of Georgia of a common law reverter,
whereby Senator Bacon's park was returned to his heirs, constituted
state action. How free was the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
to conclude that it did not? Ultimately, Justice Black, writing for the
Court, concluded in Abney that this judicial involvement was not
state action. 12 Shelley, broadly read, would also have answered the
state action issues presented by the sit-in demonstrations of the
early 1960's, but the Court chose to rest their decision elsewhere.
That the duty of obedience owed by inferior courts is informed
by how the Supreme Court treats its own precedent is also demon-
strated by the development of the first amendment issue of clear
and present danger. In 1917, two years before Justice Holmes
wrote Schenck v. United States,13 Judge Learned Hand, then a district
judge, had interpreted the same statute at issue in Schenck, the Espi-
onage Act of 1917.14 In his opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Pat-
ten, 15 Judge Hand took a different tack than Holmes did two years
later in Schenck. Judge Hand focused on the nature of the utterance
itself rather than engaging in the predictive exercise of clear and
present danger. 16 We now know that in correspondence with Pro-
fessor Zachariah Chaffee, Jr., Judge Hand was critical of Holmes'
formulation. When Dennis v. United States 17 reached the Second Cir-
cuit in 1951, Judge Hand was ChiefJudge of the Second Circuit and
10 334 U.S. I (1947).
11 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
12 Id. at 445 ("Similarly, the situation presented in this case is easily distinguishable
from that presented in Shelly v. Kraemer where we held unconstitutional state judicial
action which had affirmatively enforced a private scheme of discrimination against Ne-
groes.") (citation omitted).
13 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
14 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 11, 791-94,
2388, 3241; 22 U.S.C. §§ 213, 220-22, 401-08; 50 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192, 194 (1982)).
15 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
16 Id. at 539.
17 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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took his pen to the clear and present danger test. In reviewing these
convictions under the Smith Act, I Hand interpreted clear and pres-
ent danger to ask "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger."' 9 This was in substantial part an implementa-
tion of Judge Hands' original Masses approach. Speaking through
Chief Justice Vinson, the Supreme Court in the Dennis opinion af-
firmed, expressly adopting Judge Hand's formulation. Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion referred to the Dennis defendants'
reliance upon Holmes' formulation of clear and present danger,
stating:
In all fairness, [defendants' clear and present danger] argu-
ment cannot be met by reinterpreting the Court's frequent use of
"clear" and "present" to mean an entertainable "probability." In
giving this meaning to the phrase "clear and present danger," the
Court of Appeals was fastidiously confining the rhetoric of opin-
ions to the exact scope of what was decided by them. We have
greater responsibility for having given constitutional support,
over repeated protests, to uncritical libertarian generalities.
... [If past] decisions are to be used as a guide and not as an
argument, it is important to view them as a whole and to distrust
the easy generalizations to which some of them lend themselves.
... Viewed as a whole, [these] decisions express an attitude
toward the judicial function and a standard of values which for me
are decisive of the case before us. 20
Was Judge Leonard Hand faithful to his duty to follow
precedent?
18 Smith Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 2, 54 Stat. 670 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2385 (1982)).
19 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
20 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 527-28, 539 (Frankfurther, J., concurring).
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